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Abstract
We study an intra-household decision process in the Merton financial portfolio problem.
This writes as an optimal consumption-investment problem in finite horizon for the case
of two separate consumption streams and a shared final wealth, in a linear social welfare
setting. We show that the aggregate problem for multiple agents can be linearly separated
in multiple optimal single agent problems given an optimal sharing rule of the initial endow-
ment. Consequently, an explicit closed form solution is obtained for each subproblem, and
for the household as a whole. We show the impact of asymmetric risk aversion and market
price of risk on the sharing rule in a specified setting with mean-reverting price of risk, with
numerical illustration.
Keywords: Portfolio optimization; household decision; optimal consumption; martingale tech-
niques.
JEL: G11 (primary); C61 (secondary)
1 Introduction
An important dimension of household savings decisions is the possibility of individual consump-
tion streams out of the common wealth. In the standard household economics literature, e.g.,
[2, 1], the decision is most impacted by arbitrage with individual incomes. It has already been
argued in [19] that the household—as a risk-sharing institution—considers personal savings as
contribution to a group insurance, and that ignoring intra-household risk sharing introduces a
bias in the response of savings to income shocks. In the present paper, we take a drastically
different stand from the literature by focusing exclusively on the management of savings. The
∗The authors would like to thank the referees for helpful comments, in particular with situating the present
paper in the appropriate literature. The usual disclaimer applies. Adrien Nguyen-Huu is supported by the Chair
Energy & Prosperity, and the Labex Entreprendre. The third author acknowledges the support of NSERC grant
371653-09 and SSHRC grant 5-26758.
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goal of this paper is more precisely to study the impact of heterogeneous preferences within the
household on portfolio initial allocation, in a complex and dynamic financial world.
General intra-household decision problems constitute a well-known challenge. It is acknowledged
that bargaining concepts (Nash style or Kalay-Smorodinsky, see [16]) are not the only ”collective”
decision process alternative to modeling the household as a single decision unit. In his seminal
contribution, Chiappori [4] minimally defines collective rationality1 by simply requiring the
household to be on the Pareto-efficient frontier. This notably leads the household to derive, in
his respective labor-consumption problem, an income sharing rule based on the common initial
endowment. He [5] then shows in that setting that household decisions are efficient if and only
if some sharing rule exists. Obtaining such a rule is our objective, in a very specific context: the
Merton portfolio problem.
The optimal investment problem is much more involved than a static labor-consumption allo-
cation, for at first it is dynamical. Obtaining the initial sharing rule is only the first step of
solving the economic problem: explicit the financial strategy and the optimal consumption path
are necessary to fully understand intra-household decisions, in time. In a dynamic extension of
[4, 5], Mazzocco [17] underlines that household decisions must be specified to be under some
commitment or non-commitment paradigm: if the evolution of members endowments moves
away from the sharing rule, anticipation of that fact must be taken into present negotiation.
Under commitment, members sticks to the sharing rule while without it, the solution involves
a game-theoretic approach2. See also [6] for a recent review on that topic. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we remain under the commitment assumption. Yet in the easiest setting, the problem
remains difficult if the intra-household interactions are not specified. That is why we set the
problem for a linear household Welfare function based on separable Von-Neuman Morgenstern
utility preferences. As we obtain the optimal sharing rule in this setting (see Theorem 4.4 here-
after), we are inclined to conjecture ex-post that some collective rationality arises from it (see
in particular [4], p. 74).
How does the problem writes? Specifically, the household (e.g. spouses) involves two separated
utility functions U1 and U2 for consumption streams of money c
1 and c2 respectively, and two
distinct (non necessarily constant nor equal) discount rates β1 and β2 to measure their individual
impatience. Additionally, since we consider problem in finite horizon T , they share a common
utility function U3 to evaluate together the resulting terminal wealth XT , discounted with rate
β3. This wealth is obtained as the result of a financial portfolio strategy on the time interval
[0, T ], starting from an initial endowment X0 = x and invested in risky or riskless assets. We
pose the problem of maximizing
E
[∫ T
0
e(−
∫ t
0 β
1(s)ds)U1(c
1
t )dt+
∫ T
0
e(−
∫ t
0 β
2(s)ds)U2(c
2
t )dt+ e
(−
∫ T
0 β
3(s)ds)U3(XT )
]
, (1.1)
by choosing the optimal consumption rates (cit)t∈[0,T ] for i = 1, 2 and the portfolio allocation
1For our concern, he defines precisely Collective Rationality of Egoistic Agents (CREA), i.e., a non-cooperative
version of CR.
2In the continuous time setting, the non-commitment approach and a relative game-theoretic solution are
usually invoked in time-inconsistent optimal control problems, see e.g. [7] in a close setting. This is actually the
case here when agents have heterogeneous preferences. This is not investigated here but should definitely be a
topic for further research.
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(Xt)t∈[0,T ]. Having now sketched the mathematical problem, we may comment on it from dif-
ferent standpoints.
It is important to understand that the portfolio is a self-financing portfolio, i.e., it starts with a
given initial wealth and does not undergo any additional injection of savings. The fundamental
factors influencing the sharing rule will thus be risk aversion embedded in utility functions, and
impatience in individual discount rates. Our contribution mainly attempt to provide the sharing
rule regarding those typical financial dimensions, that is, when members of the household have
different levels of risk aversion or impatience. In this respect, our article really stands as a
contribution to the portfolio management literature.
But in the later research field, problem (1.1) is relatively new. In the classical portfolio manage-
ment problem, the single agent model is the default representation. It has already been argued
[22] that consumption and terminal wealth should be evaluated distinctly, as the nature of the
reward is different (empirical works [18] highlight a greater risk aversion toward consumption
than toward wealth). In [22], Six makes that distinction, yet for a single agent. He shows, as
we do, the separability of the problem, and that the allocation of money to consumption (the
consumption satisfaction proportion, or CSP) drastically depends—but monotonously—on the
initial wealth. By introducing two separate consumption streams, we go further than Six [22],
since there is an intricate dependence of each consumption stream with the common resulting
wealth. We show that our model, unlike the one of [22], can exhibit a hump shaped consumption
satisfaction proportion.
What other insights do we learn from this model? We end the paper with a numerical appli-
cation with closed form solutions based on the consumption-savings problem of Wachter [23].
Especially, we show that the previously mentionned consumption satisfaction proportion in-
creases with the initial endowment, but slower for the more risk averse agent. When the initial
endowment is large enough, the less risk averse agent allocates relatively more money to fu-
ture consumption. This mainly shapes the initial sharing rule, as expected. This allows us
to study consumption satisfaction proportion dependence with respect to the market price of
risk and risk aversion. The numerical results revealed that, unlike the effect of market price
of risk change which is marginal, a change in risk aversion can significantly impact the con-
sumption satisfaction proportion. Those intuitions, developed in Section 5, are for the benefit
of portfolio managers. As we mentioned it a the very beginning, we acknowledge that the study
of a household financial portfolio problem is at odd with existing literature focusing on labor-
consumption-leisure arbitrage, and that few household data would be available to help reveal
the pertinence of the implemented setting. Nevertheless, the application seems much more real-
istic when one thinks of the situation of a mutual fund portfolio manager working for a pool of
heterogeneous clients, or in the framework of a hedge fund optimal dividend distribution from
the shareholders perspective. If household decision theory is our starting point to introduce the
problem, the applications are more numerous in the financial industry. We comment shortly in
the paper on the possibility to extend the setting to n > 2 consumption streams. The reader
will easily be able transpose te present results to a much larger pool of agents.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the financial market,
assumed to be complete, portfolios and their properties. Section 3 develops the central theo-
rem, i.e., the optimal initial sharing rule. Accordingly, the problem can be separated in three
subproblems which are solved explicitely via classical duality techniques, see [13]. We comment
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also on how [22] extends non trivially from one to two agents, and how to extend the setting to
more than two. Section 5 presents the specific case based on power utility functions and a mean
reverting price of risk, first introduced in [23].
2 The financial market and portfolio properties
2.1 A complete financial market
We start by describing the dynamics of asset prices. We consider a classical framework of a
complete financial market in continuous time, with one riskless asset S0 (a bank account) and d
risky assets (S1, . . . , Sd), i.e. stocks. It is important to notice that the methodology we developed
does not extend naturally to incomplete markets. This is because of the non uniqueness of the
martingale measure, which would forbid to uniquely define the utility price of risks3.
The riskless asset will evolve at the interest rate (rt)t∈[0,T ], that is,
dS0t = rtS
0
t dt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
with S00 = s0. To model risky assets, we consider a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P) supporting
a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion W := (Wt)t∈[0,T ] = (W 1t , . . . ,W dt )Tt∈[0,T ]. As it is
usually assumed, the filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ] is the augmentation under P of the natural filtration
of W . The risky assets then follow a generalized Black-Scholes model (an Itoˆ diffusion process):
dSit = S
i
t
bi(t)dt+ d∑
j=1
σij(t)dW
j
t
 , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , (2.1)
with (S10 , . . . , S
d
0) = (s1, . . . , sd) ∈ (0,∞)d. The vector of mean rates of return
b(t) := (b1(t) . . . bd(t))
T
t∈[0,T ] and the diffusion matrix σ(t) := (σij(t))1≤i,j≤d,t∈[0,T ] are assumed
to be adapted to the filtration F . Moreover, σ(t) is assumed to be invertible for all t. The
interest rate process (r(t))t∈[0,T ] can also be made stochastic if it is assumed to be adapted.
We assume that b, σ and r are such that the stochastic differential equation (2.1) has a unique
strong solution
As usual, we use the riskless asset as a nume´raire and replace asset prices by their discounted
counterpart. The discount factor is defined by
Dt := exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r(u)du
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . (2.2)
and for a generic process Yt, Y˜t := YtDt denotes the discounted version.
Importantly, we assume that the financial market is complete, in the sense of [9]. It will mean
that no arbitrage is possible on the market and that utility price of risks can be uniquely
determined. It is defined in our setting by the existence of a unique P-equivalent martingale
3The Backward Stochastic Differential Equations approach may work in the incomplete market setting within
our context, but we leave this as topic of future research. We refer to [11] for this approach in the expected (power
and exponential) utility maximization of terminal wealth, [10] for a wider class of utility functions and [3] for the
introduction of consumption streams.
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measure P˜. If we define the price of risk process θ(t) := σ(t)−1(b(t) − r(t)1), for t ∈ [0, T ],
then market completeness translates into some integrability conditions on θ, so that W˜t :=
Wt+
∫ t
0 θ(s)ds is a Brownian motion under P˜, see [14]. We set E˜ the expectation operator under
P˜. We can also specify the Radon Nikodym derivative process of P˜ w.r.t. P as the process
Zt := exp
{
−
d∑
i=1
∫ t
0
θi(s)dW
i
s −
1
2
∫ t
0
||θ(s)||2ds
}
, for t ∈ [0, T ] . (2.3)
A sufficient condition for market completeness to hold is that the process (Zt)t∈[0,T ] is a (true)
P-martingale. We thus assume the latter throughout the paper. Sufficient conditions for Z to
be a martingale are Novikov and Kazamaki conditions [14]. If the process θ(t), t ∈ [0, T ] is
Markovian, [24] provide finer sufficient conditions. Those are not the concern of this paper.
2.2 Admissible portfolios
The above framework has been considered by [13] for a single investor and [22] focused on the
special case of an investor with two different power utilities: one for consumption and one for final
wealth. We consider here two consumption streams and one common terminal portfolio value
evaluation. We comment the generalization to an arbitrary number of consumption streams and
terminal values in subsection 3.3.
Our first concern is to represent the asset allocation. For that purpose we define a portfolio
strategy as a F-adapted Rd-valued process pi := {pi(t) = (pi1(t), . . . , pid(t))>}, where pii(ω) ∈
L2([0, T ]) for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω. The interpretation is natural: for i = 1, . . . , d, pi(t) denotes
the number of shares of asset i held in the portfolio at time t.
We then introduce consumption streams as F-adapted processes (c1t , c2t )t∈[0,T ]. They are assumed
to take non-negative values and be such that C(ω) := c1(ω) + c2(ω) is in L1([0, T ]) for P-almost
every ω ∈ Ω.
The corresponding wealth process X := (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is uniquely defined by
Xt =
1
D(t)
(
x+
∫ t
0
((
piT (s)b(s)− Cs)
)
D(s)ds+ piT (s)σ(s)D(s)dWs
))
, (2.4)
or equivalently by the discounted version
X˜t =
(
x+
∫ t
0
((
p˜iT (s)b(s)− C˜s)
)
ds+ p˜iT (s)σ(s)dWs
))
. (2.5)
Definition 2.1. A triplet (pi, c1, c2) of strategy and consumption processes is said to be admissible
for the initial endowment x ≥ 0 if the corresponding wealth process Xt, t ∈ [0, T ] satisfies Xt ≥ 0
for [0, T ] P-a.s. We call A(x) the class of admissible processes (pi, c1, c2) for initial wealth x,
and P (x) the subset of A(x) composed of triplets of the form (pi, 0, 0).
The set P (x) describes self-financed portfolio strategies in the usual sense.
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2.3 Supermartingale properties
Using standard results, we develop here intutions on how the portfolio and consumption will be
managed if the problem (1.1) can be separated in three. The results below are mostly technical
and can be skipped at first reading.
Admissibility of strategies can be expressed as a no-arbitrage or martingale property. Indeed,
one can write equation (2.4) under P˜:
X˜t +
∫ t
0
C˜sds = x+
∫ t
0
p˜iT (s)σ(s)dW˜ (s) , (2.6)
and notice that if the corresponding triplet (pi, c1, c2) is admissible, then the left-hand side of
(2.6) is non negative, and the right-hand side is a local martingale under P˜. It follows that
the left-hand side, and hence also X˜t, is a non negative super-martingale under P˜. Now, if
τ0 := T ∧ inf{0 ≤ t ≤ T,Xt = 0}, then Xt = 0 for all t ∈ [τ0, T ] on {τ0 > −∞}. The super
martingale property in (2.6) yields
E˜
[
X˜T +
∫ T
0
C˜tdt
]
≤ x . (2.7)
An immediate intuition is that after applying the sharing rule on the initial endowment, a
portfolio dedicated to consumption of one or the other member of the household, being assigned
her initial endowment, should optimally end with no wealth at all. We thus introduce for any
x > 0 the set C(x) as the set of consumption streams c(t) such that
E˜
[∫ T
0
C˜tdt
]
≤ x ; (2.8)
and D(x) the subset of C(x) when equality holds. By linearity of the expectation, C = c1 + c2 ∈
C(x1 + x2) if c
1 ∈ C(x1) and c2 ∈ C(x2) (and the same by replacing with the sets D). The
wealth process X corresponding to any C ∈ D(x) satisfies
Xt = E˜
[∫ T
t
C˜sds|Ft
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . (2.9)
In particular, XT = 0 P-a.s., as foresaw. We implicitely use expression (2.9) to construct a
portfolio from a consumption process.
Similarly for the final wealth, we define L(x) (resp. M(x)) the class of non negative random
variables L on (Ω,FT , P˜) which satisfy
E˜ [L] ≤ x ( resp. = x) . (2.10)
As shown in [22] by applying the martingale representation theorem, we can construct a portfolio
strategy pi for every given c1 + c2 ∈ C(x), such that (pi, c1, c2) ∈ A(x). Again, we can avoid
explicating pi which is deduced from other quantities. The set C(x) consists of exactly those
“reasonable” consumption processes, for which the couple of investors, starting out with wealth
x, is able to construct an admissible portfolio.
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Reciprocally for every L ∈ L(x) there exists a trio (pi, c1, c2) ∈ A(x), which can be explictely
constructed (see [22]), with corresponding wealth processX, for whichXT = L P-a.s. Specifically
there exists a portfolio strategy pi ∈ P (x) with corresponding wealth process
Xt = E˜[L|Ft], for t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.11)
Thus, the extreme elements of L(x) (i.e., in M(x)) are attainable by strategies that mandate
zero consumption. Indeed according to (2.6), the set P (x) corresponds to strategies such that
XT belongs to M(x). From now on it will be more convenient to invoke the wealth process X
rather than the precise portfolio strategy pi that needs to be implemented to obtain the former.
In the admissible case, XT ≥ 0 and Ct ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus, (pi, c1, c2) ∈ A(x) implies
c1,+c2 ∈ C(x), and XT ∈ L(x) implies inequality condition (2.8) which, together with (2.10),
turns out to be also sufficient for admissibility.
3 The household problem
3.1 Risk aversion, impatience and additional elements
Each member of the household is endowed with a utility function Ui for i = 1, 2 applied to
consumption streams, and they share a common utility U3 for the final wealth. All three
functions satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1. The function x 7→ U(x) is a strictly increasing, strictly concave real-valued
function in C2([0,∞]) such that x 7→ U ′′(x) is non decreasing, U(0) ≥ −∞ and U ′(∞) = 0.
Assumption 3.1 designates a class of functions which includes CARA and HARA utility func-
tions. Let us drop the i notation for the moment, as what follows stands for the three functions
under Assumption 3.1.
Under Assumption 3.1, a marginal utility U ′ is defined from [0,∞) onto [0, U(0)]. We denote
I := (U ′)−1, the inverse functions of the marginal utility (later indexed with i = 1, 2, 3). Note
that we allow for U(0) = −∞ or U ′(0) = ∞. Because U ′ : [0,∞] → [0, U ′(0)] is strictly
decreasing, it has a strictly decreasing inverse I : [0, U ′(0)] → [0,∞]. We extend I to be a
continuous function on the entirety of [0,∞] by setting I(y) = 0 for U ′(0) ≤ y ≤ ∞, and note
that
U(I(y)) ≥ U(c) + yI(y)− yc, for (y, c) ∈ (0,∞)× [0,∞) . (3.1)
This equation will turn to be essential in order to apply duality results in the flavor or [13].
To each utility valuation corresponds a discount rate βi assumed to be F-adapted and bounded
for all t uniformly P-almost surely. An important triplet of processes for later are the state price
processes ζi which depend on the discount rates for i = 1, 2, 3:
ζit := ZtDt exp
(∫ t
0
βi(u)du
)
=
Z˜t
Bit
.
where the process Zt, t ∈ [0, T ] is the Radon Nikodym process given by (2.3), Dt the market
discount factor from (2.2), and
Bit := exp
(
−
∫ t
0
βi(s)ds
)
, i = 1, 2, 3 (3.2)
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are notations for the discount factors for their respective utility functions. Recall now the general
discount factor process (Dt)t∈[0,T ], for it is used in the definition of the following functions defined
on R+:
Hi(y) := E˜
[∫ T
0
DuIi(yζ
i
u)du|Ft
]
for i = 1, 2 , (3.3)
and
H3(y) := E˜
[
DT I3(yζ
3
T )|Ft
]
. (3.4)
Assumption 3.2. The functions Hi are finite, i.e. for all y ∈ (0,∞) and i = 1, 2, 3, Hi(y) <∞.
The Hi functions basically stand for the dual functions, which associate a monetary worth to
a utility level y, discounted and expected properly, and play a determinant role in fixing the
sharing rule below.
Lemma 3.3. For i = 1, 2, 3, Hi is a continuous function, strictly decreasing on (0,∞) with
Hi(0) =∞ and Hi(∞) = 0
The above Lemma is proved in [13]. Since the above functions are strictly monotonous as well
and we can define Yi := H−1i the inverse of the function Hi for i = 1, 2, 3. Let us notice that
Yi : [0,∞]→ [0,∞]. We now have properly introduced the dual elements for each problem. We
end this section by introducing a technical assumption about them.
Assumption 3.4. For all y ∈ (0,∞),
E
[∫ T
0
B1t |U1(I1(yζ1t ))|dt+
∫ T
0
B2t |U2(I2(yζ2t ))|dt+B3T |U3(I3(yζ3T ))|
]
<∞ .
Furthermore assume that the functions
y 7→ E
[∫ T
0
Bit|Ui(Ii(yζ1t ))|dt
]
, i = 1, 2, y 7→ EB3T |U3(I3(yζ3T ))|,
are differentiable and the derivatives with respect to y can be taken under the expectation and
integral signs.
For example, this assumption translates into the finitness of nth order moment of the process
Z defined in (2.3), when utilities are of the nth power type. All the above assumptions are
therefore purely technical and are attributable to agents’ preferences.
3.2 Value functions
We now formalize the main problem (1.1). According to definitions (3.2), we can now rewrite
(1.1) as the objective function
J(x;pi, c1, c2) := E
[∫ T
0
(B1tU1(c
1
t ) +B
2
tU2(c
2
t ))dt+B
3
TU3(XT )
]
.
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To our optimization problem, and for a given initial wealth x > 0 shared by the agents, we can
associate the value function
V (x) := sup
(pi,c1,c2)∈A˜(x)
J(x;pi, c1, c2) , (3.5)
where the set A˜(x) is a subset of A(x) defined simply to ensure that the expectation, that is
A˜(x) :=
{
(pi, c1, c2) ∈ A(x) : |J(x;pi, c1, c2)| <∞} .
Notice that for any x > 0, A˜(x) = A(x) as soon as Ui(0) > −∞ for i = 1, 2, 3. From now on we
will exclusively focus on admissible triplets in A˜(x).
For a twice differentiable function V , we recall that the relative risk aversion is defined by
x 7→ R(x) := −xV
′′(x)
V ′(x)
. (3.6)
Anticipating theorem 4.4 below—that an optimal sharing rule exists—we define the value func-
tions associated to the three sub-problems relative to the three respective utilities. For a given
x, which is now the personal endowment following from the sharing rule, let V1 be the value
function
V1(x) := sup
(pi1,c1)∈A1(x)
J1(x;pi
1, c1) = sup
(pi1,c1)∈A1(x)
E
[∫ T
0
B1tU1(c
1
t )dt
]
(3.7)
with A1(x) :=
{
(pi1, c1) : (pi1, c1, 0) ∈ A(x) and |J1(x;pi1, c1)| <∞
}
. The value function V2 and
the set A2(x) for all x > 0 are defined in a strictly similar fashion. For the terminal wealth, we
set
V3(x) := sup
pi3∈P (x)
J3(x;pi
3) = sup
pi3∈P (x)
E
[∫ T
0
B3tU3(XT )dt
]
(3.8)
Notice that we conveniently use subsets ofA(x) (A1(x), A2(x) and P (x)) to facilitate aggregation.
3.3 Extensions
Our model can be easily extends to more than two consuming agents. The extension to more
than one evaluation of the terminal wealth is however a matter of definition. The function J is
indeed defined with only one portfolio strategy and one terminal value: the linearity of Xt in
the financial strategy pit allows to separate into three sub-problems as asserted by Theorem 4.4.
However, changing the third term in the objective function J for a term like
E
[
e(−
∫ T
0 β
1(s)ds)U4(X
1
T ) + e
(−
∫ T
0 β
2(s)ds)U5(X
2
T )
]
,
implies to define how agents 1 and 2 proceed. If they share an initial wealth, a common portfolio,
and decide at T to split the final wealth, then the problem is strictly equivalent to (3.5) with
β3 = 0 and
U3(x) := sup
∈[0,1]
e(−
∫ T
0 β
4(s)ds)U4(x) + e
(−
∫ T
0 β
5(s)ds)U5((1− )x) .
9
If one wants to distinguish agents portfolios, then he shall redefine J in order to separate trading
portfolios and consumption portfolios from t = 0. The problem can be solved by using the value
function approach of Theorem 4.4.
The utilities of the two agents consumption and the utility of the final wealth can be aggregated
by Pareto weights. These weights are a reflection of the bargaining power of the two agents. In
this case, for a given x > 0, we define the value function V evaluated at x, i.e., V (x) by
V (x) := sup
{
J(x;pi, c1, c2) : (pi, c1, c2) ∈ A˜(x)
}
, (3.9)
where
J(x;pi, c1, c2) := E
[∫ T
0
µ1(t)B1tU1(c
1
t ) + µ
2(t)B2tU2(c
2
t ))dt+ (1− µ1(t)− µ2(t))B3TU3(XT )
]
.
Here µ1(t), µ2(t) are Pareto weights in [0, 1] and t ∈ [0, T ]. Equation above can be rewritten as
J(x;pi, c1, c2) := E
[∫ T
0
B¯1tU1(c
1
t ) + B¯
2
tU2(c
2
t ))dt+ B¯
3
TU3(XT )
]
,
with
B¯it := exp
(
−
∫ t
0
β¯i(s)ds
)
, i = 1, 2, 3, (3.10)
and β¯i(t), t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, 3 appropriately chosen.
4 Solution to the problem
We start by solving problem (3.7) in subsection 4.1, and follow with problem (3.8) in subsec-
tion 4.2. The optimal sharing rule and the relation with problem (3.5) are then presented in
subsection 4.3, problem (3.5) being solved at this moment.
4.1 Solving optimal consumption problems
We hereby solve the problem (3.7) by naturally extending the solution to the other household
member. The setting and the assumptions especially allow to elicitate the explicit optimal
consumption path.
Proposition 4.1. Let x1 ≥ 0. Then V1(x1) = J1(x1;pi1(x1), c1(x1)) where for all t ∈ [0, T ],
c1t (x1) := I1(Y1(x1)ζ1t ) , (4.1)
and pi1(x1) is deduced from the wealth process
X1t (x1) := E˜
[∫ T
t
c1s (x1)Dsds|Ft
]
. (4.2)
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Proof We take
c1 = cˆ1t :=
x1
E˜
∫ T
0 Dtdt
∈ D(x1) ,
so that
E
[∫ T
0
B1tU1(cˆ
1
t )dt
]
= U1(cˆ
1)E
[∫ T
0
B1t dt
]
<∞ .
Notice that cˆ1 ∈ D(x1) and since E˜
[∫ T
0 Dtc
i
tdt
]
= H1(Y1(x1)) = x1, cit ∈ D(x1). Inequality
(3.1) implies that for any c1 ∈ C(x1) and t ∈ [0, T ],
U1(c
i
t) ≥ U1(c1t ) + Y1(x1)ζ1t cit − Y1(x1)ζ1t c1t , P− a.s.
Therefore,
E
[∫ T
0
B1tU
−
1 (c
1
t )dt
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
B1t
(
U1(cˆ
1
t ) + Y1(x1)ζ1t c1t − Y1(x1)ζ1t cˆ1t
)−
dt
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
B1t
(
U−1 (cˆ
1) + Y1(x1)ζ1t cˆ1t
)]
<∞ .
Consider the measure on [0, T ]×Ω defined by dν1(t, ω) = B1t dtP(dω) . For any other consumption
process c1 ∈ D(x1), we have∫ ∫
[0,T ]×Ω
U1(c
1
t )dν
1 ≥
∫ ∫
[0,T ]×Ω
U1(c
1
t )dν
1+
∫ ∫
[0,T ]×Ω
Y1(x1)ζ1t c1t dν1−
∫ ∫
[0,T ]×Ω
Y1(x1)ζ1t c1tdν1
By using the fact that c1, c1 ∈ D(x1),
E
[∫ T
0
B1tU1(c
1
t )dt
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
B1tU1(c
1
t )dt
]
, i = 1, 2 .
This induces optimality of c1. 
4.2 Solving the terminal wealth problem
We now turn to the final wealth valuation. As mentioned in Section 2.3, we exclusively focus
on self-financed portfolios in P (x).
Proposition 4.2. Let x3 ∈ R+. Then V3(x3) = J3(x3;pi3(x3)) where the corresponding wealth
process is given by
X3t (x3) := E˜
[
I3(Y3(x3)ζ3T )DT |Ft
]
(4.3)
with X3T (x3) = I3(Y3(x3)ζ3T )DT ∈M(x3).
Proof 1. First, we show that the (implicit) strategy pi3(x3) ∈ P (x3) and that the generated
portfolio process X3(x3) belongs to M(x3). According to (4.3), we have
E˜
[
X3T (x3)
]
= E˜ [I3(Y3(x3)ζT )] = H3(Y3(x3)) = x3 .
11
Considering the constant final wealth b := x3/E˜[DT ] ∈ D(x3), we get
U3(X
3
T (x3)) ≥ U3(b) + Y3(x3)ζ3TX3T (x3)− Y3(x3)ζ3T b P− a.s.
Therefore,
E
[
B3TU
−
3 (X
3
T (x3))
] ≤ E [B3T (U−3 (b) + Y3(x3)ζ3T b)] <∞ .
2. Let’s show that the optimal strategy requires zero consumption. Let (pi, c1, c2) ∈ A(x3) with
wealth process X be given. Define the random variable
B :=
{
x3
E˜[DTXT ]
XT if E˜[XT ] > 0
b if E˜[XT ] = 0
.
Since XT ∈ A(x3), E˜ [DTXT ] ≤ x3. Then B ∈ M(x3) and B ≥ XT P-a.s. From Section 2.3,
there exists a portfolio pˆi ∈ P (x3) with corresponding terminal wealth XˆT = B ≥ XT P-a.s.
3. To reach V3 with this strategy , it suffices to proceed as in Proposition 4.1:
E
[
B3TU3(X
3
T (x3))
] ≥ E [B3T (U3(XT ) + Y3(x3)ζ3T (X3T (x3)−XT ))] ≥ E [B3TU3(XT )] .
This implies optimality of the portfolio process X3(x3). 
4.3 The optimal sharing rule
Our main result is twofold. First, we assert that the aggregate problem can be divided in sub-
problems. Notice that a triplet of financial strategies (pi1(x1), pi
2(x2), pi
3(x3)) corresponds to
the household aggregate strategy, Each corresponds to a wealth process, see Section 2.3 above.
Linearity makes it possible to define the total portfolio pi and the aggregate wealth process X
by
pi(x1, x2, x3) := pi
1(x1) + pi
2(x2) + pi
3(x3) , (4.4)
X(x1, x2, x3) := X
1(x1) + X
2(x2) + X
3(x3) . (4.5)
Proposition 4.3. For x ≥ 0,
V (x) = max {V1(a1) + V2(a2) + V3(a3)|a1, a2, a3 ∈ [0,∞); a1 + a2 + a3 = x} . (4.6)
Proof For x ≥ 0, we are given an arbitrary triplet (pi, c1, c2) ∈ A˜(x) with corresponding wealth
process Xt. Recall that
a1 := E˜
[∫ T
0 B
1
t c
1
tdt
]
, a2 := E˜
[∫ T
0 B
2
t c
2
tdt
]
and a3 := E˜
[
B3TXT
]
.
By the super martingale property, a := a1 + a2 + a3 ≤ x and by Propositions 4.1 and 4.2,
E
[
B1tU1(c
1
t )dt
] ≤ J1(a1;pi1(a1), c1(a1)) = V1(a1),
E
[
B2tU2(c
2
t )dt
] ≤ J2(a2;pi2(a2), c2(a2)) = V2(a2),
E
[
B3TU3(XT )
] ≤ J3(a3;pi3(a3)) = V3(a3).
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Adding the three terms, we get
V1(a1) + V2(a2) + V3(a3) = J(a;pi, c
1(a1), c
2(a2)) ≥ J(a;pi, c1, c2) .
Taking the supremum over a1 + a2 + a3 ≤ x and over (pi, c1, c2) ∈ A˜(x), we get
V (x) ≤ sup {V1(a1) + V2(a2) + V3(a3) : a1, a2, a3 ∈ [0,∞); a1 + a2 + a3 ≤ x}
= sup {V1(a1) + V2(a2) + V3(a3) : a1, a2, a3 ∈ [0,∞); a1 + a2 + a3 = x}
from the non-decreasing characteristic of Vi for i = 1, 2, 3. Furthermore, by continuity of the
function (a1, a2, a3) 7→ V1(a1) + V2(a2) + V3(a3), the supremum above is attained at a point
(x1, x2, x3) and
V (x) ≤ V1(x1) + V2(x2) + V3(x3) = J(x;pi(x1, x2, x3), c1(x1), c2(x2)) ≤ V (x) .
The processes X1, X2 and X3 are nonnegative, so X is nonnegative: X is clearly in A˜(x). 
The second part of the result is the finding of the optimal sharing rule x1 + x2 + x3 = x.
Theorem 4.4. Let x > 0. Then, V (x) = V1(x1) + V2(x2) + V3(x3) with initial allocation xi is
given for i = 1, 2, 3 by
xi = Hi(Y(x)) , (4.7)
where Y : x ∈ [0,∞] 7→ Y(x) := H−1(x) := (H1 +H2 +H3)−1(x) ∈ [0,∞].
It stems from Proposition 4.3 by saying that the xi are found by using the envelope theorem,
together with Lemma 4.5 below, which implies from Assumption 3.4 that
V ′1(x1) = V
′
2(x2) = V
′
3(x3) = Y1(x1) = Y2(x2) = Y3(x3) = y ,
i.e., xi = Hi(y) = Hi(Y(x)).
Lemma 4.5. For y > 0, define
G1(y) := E
[∫ T
0
B1tU1(I1(yζ
1
t ))dt
]
, (4.8)
G2(y) := E
[∫ T
0
B2tU2(I2(yζ
2
t ))dt
]
, (4.9)
G3(y) := E
[
B3TU3(I3(yζ
3
T ))
]
. (4.10)
Then
G′i(y) = yH′i(y) i = 1, 2, 3 (4.11)
and x 7→ Vi(x) ∈ C2((0,∞)) with
V ′i (x) = Yi(x) i = 1, 2, 3, x ≥ 0 . (4.12)
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Proof According to Assumption 3.4, we can take derivatives under the expectation and integral
signs to obtain
G′1(y) = E
∫ T
0
B1t ζ
1
t I
′
1(yζ
1
t )U
′
1(I1(yζ
1
t ))dt = E
∫ T
0
B1t ζ
1
t yζ
1
t I
′
1(yζ
1
t )dt
= E˜
∫ T
0
yζ1t I
′
1(yζ
1
t )dt = yH′1(y) .
Therefore,
V ′1(x) =
d
dx
G1(Y1(x)) = Y ′1(x)G′1(Y1(x)) = Y ′1(x)Y1(x)H′1(Y1(x)) = Y1(x) .
The other derivatives are computed in the same manner. 
Let us give some intuition for this result. It says that the couple value function is the optimal
aggregation of individual value functions. This is a Pareto allocation type result (see [12] for more
on Pareto allocation); the novelty is that the Pareto weights are the initial wealth allocation.
We will also discuss the quantitative consequences of the agents specification on the splitting of
the initial wealth suggested by Theorem 4.4 in Section 5.
4.4 Delineation against the single agent case
In this section we assume that the three agents share a common initial wealth x and have CRRA
type utilities
Ui(x) =
xγi
γi
for i = 1, 2, 3.
Here 1 − γi ∈ (0,∞) is the risk aversion of agent i. Notice that x 7→ Ui(x), i = 1, 2, 3 satisfy
Assumptions 3.1, and Ii(x) = x
1
γi−1 . As it is foreseeable and proved above in subsection 2.3, the
wealth attributed to consuming agents is integrally consumed by time T . Following [22], we can
define the consumption satisfaction proportion (CSP) by (x1 + x2)/x, where x > 0 represents
the total initial wealth and x1, x2 are given by (4.7).
In the one agent case the function x 7→ CSP(x) is either increasing or decreasing. Let us prove
this claim. Recall that
x1 = k1y
1
γ1−1 , x2 = k2y
1
γ2−1 , x = x1 + x2,
for some positive constants k1, k2. Thus
CSP(x) =
k1
k2y
(
1
γ2−1−
1
γ1−1
)
+ k1
.
Moreover, x = k1y
1
γ1−1 +k2y
1
γ2−1 , whence y = f(x) for some decreasing function x 7→ f(x). This
proves the claim. Thus, if we observe a CSP function which is not monotone then we infer that
it can not be the outcome of a one agent model. In our two agent model we can observe a CSP
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function which is hump shaped (not monotone). Indeed, assume that γ1 < γ3 < γ2. Recall in
this case
x1 = k1y
1
γ1−1 , x2 = k2y
1
γ2−1 , x3 = k3y
1
γ2−1 , x = x1 + x2 + x3,
for some positive constants k1, k2, k3. Since x = k1y
1
γ1−1 + k2y
1
γ2−1 + k3y
1
γ3−1 , then y = g(x) for
some decreasing function x 7→ g(x). Moreover
1− CSP(x) = k3
k1y
(
1
γ1−1−
1
γ3−1
)
+ k2y
(
1
γ2−1−
1
γ3−1
)
+ k3
.
Since the function y 7→ k1y
(
1
γ1−1−
1
γ3−1
)
+ k2y
(
1
γ2−1−
1
γ3−1
)
+ k3 is hump shaped and the function
x 7→ g(x) is decreasing then CSP function is hump shaped as well.
Therefore the one agent model and our model are not observational equivalent.
5 Application
5.1 CRRA utilities and mean reverting market price of risk
We provide here an explicit model of the previously studied framework. The three agents share
a common initial wealth x and have CRRA type utilities
Ui(x) =
xγi
γi
for i = 1, 2, 3.
Each agent has his own constant discount rate ρi. Next take d = 1 as in [23] (the extension to
multiple stocks is straightforward). The asset price follows a geometric Brownian motion. In
order to isolate the effects of time variation on expected returns, the risk-free rate is assumed
to be constant and equal to r ≥ 0 but this assumption can be relaxed. We fix the volatility
σ := σ11 ∈ (0,∞) for (2.1), but we do not specify the drift b1 ∈ R. Instead, we model the price
of risk θ by
dθt = −λθ(θt − θ¯)dt− σθdWt , t ≥ 0 ,
where (λθ, σθ, θ¯) ∈ (0,∞)3. We assume W = W 1, so that the stock price S1t and the state
variable θt are perfectly negatively correlated. These assumptions are like those in [15], except
that the latter allows for imperfect correlation, and thus incomplete markets. The extension of
our results to incomplete markets is a non-trivial issue and is left as a topic of future research.
The body of academic literature on long term mean reversion is more tractable than that on
short term mean reversion. A comprehensive study on the existence of mean reversion in Equity
Prices has been done in [20]. The primary case for the existence of long term mean reversion
was made in two papers published in 1988, one by [21], the other by [8]. In summary, these
papers conclude that for period lengths between 3 and 5 years, long term mean reversion was
present in stock market returns between 1926 and 1985.
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5.2 Semi-explicit solutions
In this framework, the modeling assumptions of Section 2 are satisfied. We now seek for explicit
formulations in Theorem 4.4: we aim at providing the initial repartition x1, x2, x3 such that
x1 + x2 + x3 = x. We start by defining certain functions and provide the formulation of wealth
processes for each agent.
Definition 5.1. Define the functions s 7→ Aji(s), j = 1, 2, 3 verifying
A1i(0) = A2i(0) = A3i(0) = 0 , 0 ≤ s ≤ T , (5.1)
and satisfying the following system of ODEs
−A′1i(s)− 2λθA1i(s) + σ2θA1i(s)2 + γ1(1−γ1)2 = 0
−A′2i(s) + λθ(θ¯A1i(s)−A2i(s)) + σ2θA1i(s)A2i(s) = 0
−A′3i(s) + λθθ¯A2i(s) + σ
2
θ
2 (A1i(s) +A2i(s)
2) = 0
. (5.2)
Define for i = 1, 2, 3 the function Hi : [0, T ]× R→ (0,∞) by
Hi(τ, θ) := exp
(
A1i(τ)
θ2
2
+A2i(τ)θ +A3i(τ)− r(1− γi) + ρi
1− γi τ
)
,
The following holds:
Proposition 5.2. Define the process Yt, t ∈ [0, T ] by
Yt := (yZt)
−1ert, (5.3)
with y = Y(x) and the process Zt, t ∈ [0, T ] given by Definition (2.3). For i = 1, 2, 3, we have:
Xit = F
i(t, θt, Yt) (5.4)
where
F i(t, θ, y) =
y
1
1−γi e
(r+ρi)t
1−γi
∫ T−t
0 Hi(θ, τ)dτ for i = 1, 2
y
1
1−γ3 e
(r+ρ3)t
1−γ3 H3(θ, T − t) for i = 3
(5.5)
Proof Following Theorem 4.4, the optimal initial allocation is given by xi = Hi(Y(x)). De-
noting y := Y(x) = Yi(xi), the theorem gives also the optimal consumption
cit(xi) = Ii(yζ
i
t) = (y exp(ρit)Zt)
1
γi−1 , 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
where Zt, t ∈ [0, T ] is the state density process defined by (2.3). By Ito’s formula,
dYt = (r + θ
2
t )Ytdt+ θtYtdWt (5.6)
The optimal total wealth process of agent i is thus given by
Xit = E˜
[∫ T
t
Dsc
i
sds|Ft
]
, t ∈ [0, T ].
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We have the relations cis = (ye
ρisZs)
1
γi−1 = (eρisersY −1s )
1
γi−1 , ZsZt = e
r(s−t) Yt
Ys
and Ds = e
−rs.
For i = 1, 2, 3, define f i(t, τ, θ) by:
f i(t, τ, θ) = E
[
exp
(
γi
2(1− γi)
∫ τ
t
θ2sds+
γi
1− γi
∫ τ
t
θsdWs
)
|θt = θ
]
.
So, for i = 1, 2
Xit = E
[∫ T
t
Zs
Zt
Dsc
i
sds|Ft
]
= Et
[∫ T
t
er(s−t)
Yt
Ys
e−rsY
1
1−γi
s e
(r+ρi)
s
γi−1ds
]
= Y
1+
γi
1−γi
t Et
[∫ T
t
e
−rt− (ρi+r)s
1−γi
(
Ys
Yt
) γi
1−γi
ds
]
= Y
1
1−γi
t
∫ T
t
e
−rt− (ρi+r)s
1−γi +
rγi(s−t)
1−γi f i(t, s, θt)ds
It is easy to see that we just have to replace s by T in the integral term to obtain X3t :
X3t = Y
1
1−γ3
t e
−rt− (ρ3+r)T
1−γ3 +
rγ3(T−t)
1−γ3 f3(t, T, θt)
For, 0 ≤ t ≤ τ , the process
f i(t, τ, θt) exp
(
γi
2(1− γi)
∫ t
0
θ2sds+
γi
1− γi
∫ t
0
θsdWs
)
,
is a conditional expectation of a FT -measurable random variable for any fixed θ. It is then
a P-martingale on time τ ≤ T . Notice that in the definition of f i(t, τ, θ), the coefficients of
the exponential are independent of t. Therefore we look for f i(t, τ, θ) of the form f i(t, τ, θt) :=
gi(τ−t, θt). We make the change of variables τ−t := s. Given that the function (s, θ) 7→ gi(s, θ)
is C1,2, it follows by Ito’s formula that
−gis − λθ(θ − θ¯)giθ +
σ2θ
2
giθθ +
(
γi
2(1− γi) +
γ2i
2(1− γi)2
)
θ2gi = 0 . (5.7)
with the condition gi(0, θ) = 1. We follow [23] and search for gi(s, θ) of the form
gi(s, θ) = exp
(
A1i(s)
θ2
2
+A2i(s)θ +A3i(s))
)
,
where A1i, A2i, A3i are three continuous functions of s. The terminal condition in the latter
expression implies condition (5.1). Plugging the expression of gi(s, θ) in (5.7), we get a second-
order polynomial in θ
θ2
[
−A′1i(s)− 2λθA1i(s) + σ2θA1i(s)2 +
γi
(1− γi)2
]
+θ
[−A′2i(s) + λθ(θ¯A1i(s)−A2i(s)) + σ2θA1i(s)A2i(s)]
−A′3i(s) + λθθ¯A2i(s) +
σ2θ
2
(A1i(s) +A2i(s)
2) = 0
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Since the equation holds for any θ ∈ R, we separate the coefficients in θ2, θ and constant to
obtain (5.2). Thus, the functions gi and Hi are equal. 
If a C1 function s 7→ A1i(s), s ∈ [0, T − t] has been found, then s 7→ A2i(s) is given by a linear
ODE, which finally allows to retrieve s 7→ A3i(s) :
A3i(s) =
∫ s
0
λθθ¯A2i(u) +
σ2θ
2
(A1i(u) +A2i(u)
2)du .
This allows for the detailed numerical analysis we present in subsection 5. The following provides
the missing part.
Proposition 5.3. Let A1i(s) be a solution on {0 ≤ t ≤ T − t} of the ODE
−A′1i(s)− 2λθA1i(s) + σ2θA1i(s)2 +
γi
(1− γi)2 = 0 (5.8)
such that A1i(0) = 0. Then, denoting ∆ = λ
2
θ −
γiσ
2
θ
(1−γi)2 , the function s 7→ A1i(s) is defined on
[0, T − t] by
A1i(s) =

γi
(1− γi)2σθ
1− exp(−2√∆σ2θs)
λθ +
√
∆− (λθ −
√
∆) exp(−2√∆σ2θs)
if ∆ > 0
λ2θs
σ2θλθs+ σ
2
θ
if ∆ = 0
1
σ2θ
(√−∆ tan(−√−∆s+ arctan( −λθ√−∆))+ λθ) if ∆ < 0
. (5.9)
Proof
Case 1: ∆ > 0. There are two distinct roots to the characteristic polynomial of the ODE, given
by m± := λθσθ ±
√
∆. A general solution A1(t) to (5.8) shall verify
σθ =
σθA
′
1i(τ)
(σθA1i(τ)− λθσθ )2 − σ2θ∆
σθs =
∫ s
0
σθA
′
1i(τ)dτ
(σθA1i(τ)− λθσθ − σθ
√
∆)(σθA1i(τ)− λθσθ + σθ
√
∆)
=
∫ A1i(s)
0
σθdx
(σθx− σθm+)(σθx− σθm−)
=
1
σθ(m+ −m−)
∫ A1i(s)
0
dx
x−m+ −
dx
x−m− ,
=
1
2σθ
√
∆
log
(
(A1i(s)−m+)m−
(A1i(s)−m−)m+
)
,
Therefore,
A1i(s)−m+
A1i(s)−m− =
m+
m−
exp
(
2
√
∆σ2θs
)
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with
A1i(s) = m+ +
2σθ
√
∆
1− m+m− exp
(
2
√
∆σ2θs
) ∀t ≤ τ .
Case 2: ∆ = 0. With the double root m := λθ/σ
2
θ , the same operation provides
σθ =
A′1i(τ)
(A1i(τ)−m)2
σθs =
∫ s
0
A′1i(τ)
(A1i(τ)−m)2dτ
σθs =
(
− 1
m
+
1
m−A1i(s)
)
.
The solution then follows:
A1i(s) =
σθm
2s
1 +mσθs
Case 3: ∆ < 0. We can write the ODE as
−A′1i(s) +
(
σθA1i(s)− λθ
σθ
)2
− ∆
σ2θ
= 0 .
Taking y(s) := (σ2θA1i(s)− λθ)/
√−∆′, we get
arctan(y(s))− arctan
(
− λθ√−∆′
)
= −√−∆s
providing the solution. 
Notice that s 7→ A1i(s) is not continuous nor well defined for all s, if ∆ ≤ 0. The condition
∆ > 0 can also write
γ1 < γlim :=
2
2 + b+
√
(2 + b)2 − 4 for b :=
σ2θ
λ2θ
.
Proposition 5.2 provides the portfolio process value for a consuming agent.
Corollary 5.4. Let si =
∫ T
0 Hi(θ0, s)ds, for i = 1, 2 and s3 = H3(θ0, T ). The initial allocations
for the three agents are: 
x1 = y
1
γ1−1
∫ T
0 H1(s, θ0)ds = y
1
γ1−1 s1
x2 = y
1
γ2−1
∫ T
0 H2(s, θ0)ds = y
1
γ2−1 s2
x3 = y
1
γ3−1H3(T, θ0) = y
1
γ3−1 s3
(5.10)
where y = Y(x) is uniquely defined such that x1 + x2 + x3 = x.
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Proposition 5.5. The investment pii corresponding to agent i is given by
piit =
1
σF i
(
Ytθt
∂F i
∂Y
− σθ ∂F
i
∂θ
(t, θt, Yt)
)
(5.11)
Proof We apply Itoˆ’s lemma to the equality Xit = F
i(t, θt, Yt).
dXit = (rX
i
t − cit)dt+ b(t)piitdt+ σpiitdWt = (LF i +
∂F i
∂t
) dt+ (
∂F i
∂θ
(−σθ) + ∂F
i
∂Y
Ytθt)dWt.
Writing the equality between the dWt terms yields:
σpiitF
i = Y θ
∂F i
∂Y
− σθ ∂F
i
∂θ
which ends the proof. 
The economic consequences of these equations are explored in the next subsection. We continue
here to explore the analytical results.
Proposition 5.6. Assume that θt > 0 (positive MPR). If γi < 0, i = 1, 2, the CSP decreases
with θ. On the other hand if γi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, the CSP increases with θ.
Proof From direct computations one gets
dy
dθ
=
y
1
γ1−1ds1 + y
1
γ2−1ds2(
s1
1−γ1 y
1
γ1−1−1 + s21−γ2 y
1
γ2−1−1 + s31−γ3 y
1
γ3−1−1
)
dθ
.
Moreover
d
dθ
(
x1 + x2
x
)
=
d
dθ
(
1− x3
x
)
= −dx3
xdθ
=
y
1
γ3−1−1dy
(1− γ3)xdθ .
If θt > 0 and γi < 0, it follows from the monotonicity of A1i and A2i that
A1i(0, T − t)θt +A2i(0, T − t) ≤
∫ T−t
0
pi(θt, t, τ)(A1i(0, τ)θt +A2i(0, τ))dτ ≤ 0 .
On the other hand if γi ≥ 0,
0 ≤
∫ T−t
0
pi(θt, t, τ)(A1i(0, τ)θt +A2i(0, τ))dτ ≤ A1i(0, T − t)θt +A2i(0, T − t) .

During favorable market conditions, i.e., when θ is increasing, the agents behave differently
according to their risk aversion. Thus, if they are more risk averse they will use a higher
fraction of the initial wealth to finance investment; else if they are less risk averse they will use
a higher fraction of the initial wealth to finance consumption.
20
Proposition 5.7. Assume that γ1 < γ2 < γ3. Then we get the following assymptotics for the
couple risk aversion
lim
x→∞R(x) = (1− γ1)
H3(1)
H1(1) and limx→0R(x) = (1− γ3)
H1(1)
H3(1) .
Proof Recall that V (x) = G(Y(x)) and V ′(x) = Y(x). Thus V ′′(x) = Y ′(x) = 1/H′(y) (with
y := Y(x)) and R(x) = −xY ′(x)/Y(x) = −H(y)/(yH′(y)). In light of
H(y) = y 1γ1−1H1(1) + y
1
γ2−1H2(1) + y
1
γ3−1H3(1) ,
it follows that
R(x) =
y
1
γ1−1H1(1) + y
1
γ2−1H2(1) + y
1
γ3−1H3(1)
y
1
γ1−1 H1(1)
1−γ1 + y
1
γ2−1 H2(1)
1−γ2 + y
1
γ3−1 H3(1)
1−γ3
,
whence the claim. 
For small initial wealth or high initial wealth the couple risk aversion is driven by one of the
agents. Thus, the less risk averse agent determines the couple’s utility for little initial wealth.
This is in accordance with risk seeking agents behavior when the latter are poor.
5.3 Numerical results
In the section 4.4 the consumption satisfaction proportion (CSP) dependence on the initial
wealth was explored. In this section we further study CSP dependence on other model param-
eters. More precisely, placing ourselves in the setting of section 5, and taking advantage of
the closed form formulas established there, we investigate the CSP dependence with respect to
market price of risk in one hand and the agents risk aversion on the other hand. Our closed
formulas are explicit up to computing some integrals, task which we perform using the modified
Euler numerical scheme. In our numerical experiments we have chosen the following financial
market parameters:
(r, σθ, λθ, θ¯) = (0.048, 0.0655, 0.2712, 0.9456) .
The (total) initial wealth x is set to 10, i.e., x = 10. In figure 1 we observe the effect on CSP of
the market price of risk θ. Here (γ1, γ2, γ3) = (−9,−3,−2). The findings are in accordance with
Proposition 5.6. The agents will use a higher fraction of the initial wealth to finance investment
in favorably financial market conditions since they are risk averse. This in turn will make CSP
decrease with respect to the market price of risk. By looking at figure 1 we notice that the effect
of market price of risk on CSP is nearly marginal; a change in market price of risk will cause at
most 8% change in CSP.
Let us next explore the effect of first agent change in risk aversion on CSP. In figure 2, we vary
γ1 while holding γ2 = −3, and γ3 = −2. As expected, when agent 1 becomes more risk-averse
his initial wealth allocation for financing his/her consumption increases and this will translate
in an increase in CSP. By looking at figure 2 we notice that the effect of first agent change in
risk aversion on CSP is considerable; a change in first agent risk aversion will cause up to 50%
change in CSP.
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We conclude by exploring the effect of the couple change in risk aversion on CSP. In figure 3,
we vary γ3 while holding γ1 = −9, and γ2 = −3. As expected the initial wealth allocation for
financing investment increases in γ3 (since the couple becomes less risk averse). This in turn will
make CSP decrease in γ3. By looking at figure 3 we notice that the effect of the couple change
in risk aversion on CSP is considerably; a change in couple risk aversion will cause up to 70%
change in CSP.
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Figure 1: Fraction of initial wealth as a function of θ.
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Figure 2: Fraction of initial wealth as a function of risk aversion γ1, for γ1 ≤ γ3.
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Figure 3: Fraction of initial wealth as a function of γ3.
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